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Ricky Wichum, Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg 
 
At the beginning of his lecture, Security, Territory, Population (1977/78), Michel Foucault raises 
the question of whether it can be regarded as true “that the general economy of power in our 
societies is becoming a domain of security.”1  This question should not be answered hastily 
here.  Rather, it is to serve as a starting-point for a reflection on Michel Foucault’s thinking in 
the field of security.  This text goes back to an interdisciplinary workshop on Security Disposi-
tifs. Technology—Space—Event2 held at Freiburg in May 2012 that brought together scholars 
from the fields of geography, sociology, literature, criminology, anthropology, and Media 
Studies.  Following the presentations and discussions there, this text will demonstrate how 
contemporary theories of security draw on Foucauldian thinking for developing their theses, 
terms, and categories.  The purpose of the workshop was to explore the potentials of connect-
ing Foucault’s work on security dispositifs to contemporary analyses of strategies and regimes 
of (in-)security.  Thus, this text will address five central issues: security as dispositif (1), popu-
lation and crowds (2), technologies of security (3), temporalities of security (4), and spaces of 
security (5), giving a conclusion and an outlook at the end (6). 
 
1. Security as Dispositif 
Analyzing security as a dispositif in the sense of Foucault, basically means to understand se-
curity not as an essential part of the human condition, or an a priori social value.  In this per-
spective, the demand for security is neither the result of speech acts (‘Securitization’3) nor a 
side effect of high-tech risk societies,4 nor can it be reduced to an essential function of the 
modern state.  The study of security within the grid of Governmentality Studies is clearly dis-
                                                 
1 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-78 (Basingstoke: Palgra-
ve Macmillan, 2009, 10-11). 
2 The workshop at the University of Freiburg was organized by Serhat Karakayali (University of Halle-
Wittenberg), Sven Opitz (University of Hamburg), Ulrich Bröckling (University of Freiburg), and Stefan 
Kaufmann (University of Freiburg) and funded by Volkswagen-Stiftung.  For more detailed conference pro-
ceedings cf. Sabine Blum & Ricky Wichum, “Tagungsbericht Security Dispositifs. Technology—Space—
Event. 10.05.2012-11.05.2012, Freiburg im Breisgau.“ H-Soz-u-Kult, 21.06.2012, http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-
berlin.de/tagungsberichte/id=4294. 
3 Cf. Ole Wæver, “Securitization and Desecuritization,” in Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.), On Security. New Direc-
tions in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995). 
4 Cf. Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (London; California; New Dehli: Sage, 1992). 
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tinct from such concepts.  Governmentality Studies encompass security as strategical effect of 
specific relations of power, knowledge, and subjectivity.  Consequently, both the discourses 
and the materialities of security become the focus of analysis.  From this viewpoint, the key 
question is: In the present demand for security, how do specific problematizations of risks and 
threats connect to certain forms of knowledge, practices, technologies, and affects, to create 
(un-)stable assemblages of (in-)security that even amplify each other?  As Luis Lobo Guerrero 
pointed out during the workshop, a revealing question could be why the anxious pursuit of 
collective security is so important for modern western societies.  Hence, we are to explore the 
epistemological principles, the conditions of possibility of (moral) orders of security in con-
temporary societies.  A critique of governing (in-)security following Foucault thus resists the 
political rhetoric of insecure and uncertain times since the end of Cold War respectively 9/11 
and emphasizes in contrast the contingencies of propositions and moral values of security. 
 
2. Population and Crowds 
The fundamental object of governmental security dispositifs is the population.  Foucault un-
derstands population not as the entirety of all the state’s subjects, but as an entity “with its 
specific phenomena and processes.”5  A basic feature of the population is that it cannot be 
transparent to the sovereign’s action, it “escapes the sovereign’s voluntarist and direct action 
in the form of the law.”6  Despite this, the population in its ‘naturalness,’ represents a field of 
governmental intervention (government in the broad understanding of Foucault), since it is “a 
set of elements in which we can note constants and regularities… and with regard to which we 
can identify a number of modifiable variables on which it depends.”7  In her keynote speech, 
Claudia Aradau depicted the crowd as an actual strategy of governmental intervention to 
modify a specific social entity that is on the one hand a part of population and on the other 
hand escapes logics of population.  However, Aradau indicated how in contemporary strate-
gies of counter-terrorism and emergency planning the crowd is indirectly reconfigured as “a 
surface on which authoritarian, but reflected and calculated transformations can get a hold.”8  
By reformulating the contingencies of terrorism as a problem of governing and controlling 
crowds, as Aradau showed, the crowd itself is put into the scope of contemporary security 
dispositifs as a continually threatened and threatening social entity.  The logic of crowd con-
trol increasingly circulates and pervades the spaces of society.  Crowds are everywhere—at 
workplaces, at hotels, at shopping malls, at schools, or hospitals.  In the context of counter-
terrorism, however, crowds are no longer described as the irrational and pathological anti-
nomism of the social order.  Based on a transformed social-psychological knowledge, they are 
regarded as governable, de-democratized social units.  The potential for crowds as a political 
subject, as for example Canetti described it, is systematically denied in these strategies.9 
 
 
                                                 
5 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 66. 
6 Ibid., 71. 
7 Ibid., 74. 
8 Ibid., 75. 
9 Cf. Elias Canetti, Crowds and power, 1st edition (New York: Noonday Press, 1984). 
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3. Technologies of Security  
Within the logic of liberal governmentality as analyzed by Foucault, the security of the popu-
lation is the constitutive counterpart to its freedom—although liberalism defines freedom not 
as much as an imperative than as “the management and organization of the conditions in 
which one can be free.”10  Freedom is something “which is constantly produced.”11  But if 
freedom is indeed an artificial product, then in the very core of this production there lies a 
problematic relationship between the production of freedom and the continuous possibility of 
its restriction.  The possibility to restrict freedom is therefore an essential part of freedom.  It is 
at this point security dispositifs come into play.  They act as the correlate of freedom within 
liberal rationality.  Foucault puts it like this: 
 
An apparatus of security… cannot operate well except on condition that is given freedom, in 
the modern sense [the word] acquires in the eighteenth century: …the possibility of move-
ment, change of place, and processes of circulation of both people and things.  I think it is 
this freedom of circulation… it is in terms of this option of circulation, that we should un-
derstand the word freedom, and understand it as one of the… dimensions of the deploy-
ment of apparatuses of security.12  
 
The relationship of freedom and security is thus subject to a liberal-economic calculation, 
where circulation is defined as the essential problem of security.  The field of interventions for 
security dispositifs is organized around the following question: “How should things circulate 
or not circulate?”13  The increasing usage of security technologies as for example biometrics, 
full-body scanners or CCTV could be interpreted as an answer to this question by contempo-
rary liberal security dispositifs.  Security technologies, installed at borders or urban places, are 
in this sense an attempt to govern circulation processes at the population level in an economi-
cal and rational way.14  The contemporary governance of circulation, as Vasilis Tsianos and 
Sebastian Sierra Barra showed at the workshop, is set in motion through computerization and 
digitization.  Control regimes of security15 shape the tension between freedom and security in 
order to maximize ‘good’ circulation by duplicating and combining individuals, their bodies, 
and their behavior to form digital data bodies and storing them in digital databases.  Tsianos 
illustrated this through the example of the EURODAC database, which is used to keep out 
‘illegal’ refugees at external EU borders.  He showed how risks of this ‘bad’ mobility are mate-
rialized into digital data bodies of refugees, thus focusing on the processes, which connect real-
life individuals to their data.   
                                                 
10 Cf. Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France 1978-1979 (Basingstoke; New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 63-64. 
11 Ibid., 65. 
12 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 48-49. 
13 Ibid., 64. 
14 Cf. Thomas Lemke, “‘Eine Kultur der Gefahr‘ - Dispositive der Unsicherheit im Neoliberalismus,” Wider-
spruch 24 (46) (2004), 89–98. 
15 Deleuze describes these regimes as ‘societies of control.’  Gilles Deleuze, “Postscript on the Societies of 
Control,” October 59 (2009), 3–7. 
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Considering the increasing technologization and computerization of life in general and 
of control in particular, Sierra Barra asked to which extent the Foucauldian concepts of disci-
pline, surveillance and control are still sufficient under conditions of omnipresent data bodies 
in everyday life.  This question is of special importance since Foucault developed these con-
cepts under the assumption of the centrality of biological life.  We can agree to Sierra Barra’s 
observation that the relationship between security and technology needs further theoretical 
assessment and that in this respect the notion of dispositif should be supplemented by taking 
a look at Science and Technology Studies (STS) or Actor-Network Theory (ANT).  Taking the fun-
damental changes in non-discursive requirements into account, Sierra Barra proposed to use 
Bruno Latour’s concept of ‘powers of associations’ for that purpose.16  Tsianos, by contrast, 
emphasizing the connections between technologies, social practices, and forms of knowledge, 
pointed to the term ‘surveillant assemblage,’ as elaborated by Haggerty and Ericson.17  
In a theoretical view, security technologies cannot be conceptualized as neutral and 
powerless inscription devices of social interests.  By contrast, their specific economies of power 
and distinct processes of subjectivization should be the focus of analysis.  For instance, bio-
metric systems seeking to identify individuals at borders are, on the one hand, biopolitical 
technologies that govern circulation by identifying and excluding potentially dangerous ele-
ments.  On the other hand, the criteria and juridical mechanisms used for this process rest 
upon the sovereign power of (nation) states or their alliances.  Moreover, the architectural de-
sign of such arrangements of control shows significant signs of disciplinary logic, where the 
individuals are arrested, normalized through technological processes, and finally arranged 
within a tableau (database) for the purpose of control.  So, as a first step, the focus of research 
should rest on the specific logic of the peculiar (technological) setting, characteristic features 
that quite often produce disruptions or frictions within overlapping rationalities of power. 
 
4. Temporalities of Security 
Security dispositifs aim at what not yet has happened.  As a result, security strategies operate 
as a management of “open series [that] can only be controlled by an estimate of probabili-
ties.”18  Following Foucault, threats to freedom in the economy of security assume the shape of 
uncertain, unpredictable events that might never happen but are always possible.19  This con-
tingency of threat is rationalized by security dispositifs—paradigmatically, in the ‘war on ter-
ror’—through logics of preemption, precaution, and preparedness.20  Each of them enacts dif-
                                                 
16 Cf. Bruno Latour, “The Powers of Association,” in John Law (ed.), Power, Action, and Belief: A New Sociology 
of Knowledge? Sociological Review Monograph 32 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986). 
17 Cf. Kevin D. Haggerty & Richard V. Ericson, “The surveillant assemblage,” British Journal of Sociology 51 (4) 
(2000), 605–22. 
18 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 20. 
19 Cf. Christopher Daase & Oliver Kessler, “Knowns and Unknowns in ‘The War on Terror‘: Uncertainty and 
the Political Construction of Danger,” Security Dialogue 38 (4) (2007), 411–34; Oliver Kessler & Christopher 
Daase, “From Insecurity to Uncertainty: Risk and the Paradox of Security Politics,” Alternatives: Global, Local, 
Political (33) (2008), 211–32. 
20 Concerning these anticipatory logics cf. Ben Anderson, “Preemption, Precaution, Preparedness: Anticipa-
tory Action and Future Geographies,” Progress in Human Geography 34 (6) (2010), 777–98. 
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ferent forms of knowledge and practices to govern the radically unknown.  In this framework, 
threats are regarded not so much as material issues, but mainly from a temporal point of view, 
as Susanne Krasmann demonstrated at the workshop, using the example of targeted killings.  
Basically, this practice is deduced from logics of preemption, aiming to counteract a threat 
before it has materialized.  Under conditions of radical uncertainty, the sanctioning interven-
tion precedes the anticipated action.  In the logic of preemption, targeted killings by state au-
thorities are reconfigured as an adequate answer to the threat of terrorist networks—as quasi 
state-like enemies—at the same time inscribing these practices into the law.  But how can pro-
active killings become legally verified and defined as lawful?  As Krasmann illustrated, they 
become a legal practice by applying temporal criteria, i.e., the imminence and gravity of possi-
ble threats.  The practice of targeted killing at the same time constitutes and verifies the deadly 
threat it tries to preempt by acts of legitimate self-defense.  In this way, targeted killing is per-
formative.  Also, it is not a practice of a sovereign state of emergency, since it does not suspend 
the norms of law, but always preemptively adjusts them to the reality of targeted killing.21 
According to Ben Anderson, even for cases of emergency, the theory of the sovereign 
state of emergency is not the only viable perspective.  Emergencies can also be understood by 
looking at governmental logics of security, since in cases of emergency, different temporal re-
gimes culminate as well: the eschatological time of the future catastrophe, the cyclical time of 
routines, and the linear time of specific sequences of actions to be initiated as soon as a case of 
emergency commences.  Each one of these temporalities implies certain practices and tech-
nologies: technologies of preparedness or emergency drills play a crucial role in anticipating 
cases of emergency, thus installing the case of emergency as a future potentiality, which is 
nevertheless ever-present in everyday actions, even if it remains absent in its actuality.  For 
this reason, as Serhat Karakayali stressed, even criticizing mechanisms of security for dissolv-
ing the normative structure of action misses the point.  According to this criticism common 
today, the future unjustly gains primacy over both the present and the past, reducing capabili-
ties of self-conscious action to a merely conditioned behavior in the form of stimulus and re-
sponse.  To oppose these critics, again, we can consider that security dispositifs anticipate the 
radical uncertainty of threatening events by activating specific practices and forms of knowl-
edge as well as discursive and non-discursive elements to rationalize this uncertainty.  It re-
mains to be seen if there are specific fields of society, which imply hegemonic forms of manag-
ing the future.  What, for instance, is the difference between logics of preemption in the mili-
tary and in the insurance industry?  What is the role of the law in stabilizing anticipative 
strategies in contemporary societies? 
 
5. Spaces of Security 
Up to date, spaces of security remain a widely unreflected area in the field of critical security 
research.  Given the fact that space, in the sense of ‘territory,’ even occurs in the title of Fou-
                                                 
21 For a contemporary theory of exception, cf. Girogio Agamben’s ‘Homo-Sacer’ trilogy. Giorgio Agamben, 
Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998); Giorgio Agamben, 
Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive (New York: Zone Books, 2000); Giorgio Agamben, State of 
exception (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
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cault’s first lecture on the history of governmentality, this is especially astonishing.  Foucault 
ties the notion of ‘territory’ to the economy of sovereign power.  Sovereign power “involved 
something that we could call precisely the safety of the territory, or the safety of the sovereign 
who rules over the territory.”22  This tight connection between sovereignty and territory is es-
sential.  Thus, Foucault conceptualizes the mechanisms of a power referring to territory in con-
trast to strategies of security that aim at the ‘population.’  Security dispositifs process space by 
working with “a number of material givens.”23  Security operates by “maximizing the positive 
elements, for which one provides the best possible circulation, and of minimizing what is risky 
and inconvenient.”24  Spatial elements are regulated according to their respective probabilities: 
“The specific space of security refers… to the temporal and the uncertain, which have to be 
inserted within a given space.”25  Besides distinguishing between spaces of sovereignty and 
spaces of security, Foucault also highlights spaces of discipline.  Discipline takes possession of 
spaces by designing them, starting off with the “constitution of an empty, closed space.”26  Its 
way of processing space is guided by the principle of partitioning: “One must eliminate the 
effects of imprecise distributions, the uncontrolled disappearance of individuals, their diffuse 
circulation, their unusable and dangerous coagulation… Its aim was to establish presences 
and absences, to know where and how to locate individuals.”27  In other words, discipline or-
ganizes an analytical space. 
Starting from these theoretical differentiation of spatiality in Foucault’s work—
heterotopias, as spaces of “counter-sites,”28 would make another one—, the workshop tested 
the potential of these concepts for an analysis of contemporary spaces of security in three 
ways.  Firstly, the intersection of territories of sovereignty and spaces of security was dis-
cussed.  Sven Opitz and Ute Tellmann pointed out that processes of globalization do not so 
much dissolve sovereign state territories as they make them correlate with liberal-
governmental mechanisms of space arrangement in many ways.  Using the example of two 
offshore zones—a refugee camp on Christmas Islands near Australia and offshore banks on 
the Cayman Islands—they demonstrated how global flows of people and money are governed 
in different ways, by constructing two contradictory juridico-political zones.  Offshore zones 
establish a partition on sovereign territories between inside and outside, presence and ab-
sence, visibility and invisibility.  For example, the refugee camp on Christmas Islands belongs 
to the sovereign territory of Australia.  But at the same time, the camp is legally split off from 
the mainland, because the Australian government declared it as “excised offshore places”.  
Moreover, with regard to offshore entry persons, the government created a distinct legal per-
sona with limited rights (“unlawful non-citizens.”)  Offshore-territories, according to Opitz 
                                                 
22 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 65. 
23 Ibid., 19. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., 20. 
26 Ibid., 17. 
27 Cf. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, translated by Alan Sheridan (New York: 
Vintage Books. 1979), 143.  
28 Cf. Michel Foucault, “Of Other Spaces,” Diacritics 16 (1) (1986), 24. 
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and Tellmann, could in this sense be described as the heterotopias of today’s liberal-
democratic circulation regimes.   
Secondly, the analytical focus on spaces of security was expanded to include other 
shapes of territoriality.  Burkhardt Wolf unfurled a history of risk and insurance, locating their 
common starting point at the separation between land and sea.  On the one hand, the sea was 
imagined as a realm of endless and unpredictable dangers, while on the other, it thus served 
as the very reason for the emergence of insurance companies, which can be seen as institutions 
for predicting the unpredictable.  This doubling of imagination and calculation, as Wolf dem-
onstrated, is exemplary for western societies’ attempts in ‘making security.’  He depicted the 
inner contradictions and paradoxes of these attempts by referring to Joseph Conrad’s narrative 
The Partner.  Insurances, through their very existence, create new, unpredictable risks, espe-
cially the risk of insurance fraud.  By hindsight, events could always have happened in one 
way or another.  The only possible way to reconstruct the course of events is to draw on sec-
ond-order observations.  The disconnection of land and sea is suspended under these condi-
tions.   
Thirdly, the workshop emphasized the relationship between space and affects.  In this 
respect, Andrew Neal, and Chris Zebrowski explored the practice of kettling by the police as a 
spatial strategy of crowd control within urban milieus.  As a temporarily established territory, 
a kettle serves to contain uncontrolled movements, to localize and confine.  In this sense, it 
may be interpreted as an answer to new, highly flexible, and dynamical forms of social protest 
using, first of all, new communication technologies.  In essence, kettling is about proactive 
control of affective intensities: immobilizing movements, cooling down emotions, demoraliz-
ing kettled individuals—thus dissolving the collective political subject constituted by the pro-
testers.  Peter Adey clarified which kinds of affects, emotions, and intensities are produced 
through the design of spaces of security.  Perceptions of (in-)security or the desire for security 
cannot just be traced back to stimulated responses to specific (real) threats.  Rather, they are 
permanently evoked by architectural designs of spaces of security.  Warning labels, loud-
speaker announcements, or pictographs, working as simple but highly effective artifacts, per-
manently elicit feelings of insecurity, thereby creating specifically intensive forms of space 
perception.  Analyzing spaces of security in accordance with Foucault means to understand 
space in its modes of re-territorialization and de-territorialization and to explore its relational-
ity within different dispositifs of power. 
 
6. Conclusion and Outlook 
Based on the workshop Security Dispositifs.  Technology—Space—Event, this text aimed at retrac-
ing the potentials of interdisciplinary, critical, security research influenced by the work of 
Michel Foucault.  The core project here is to understand security as a dispositif and to make 
use of the concept as an analytical grid in order to both follow Foucault’s achievements and to 
go beyond them, connecting theoretical reflection with empirical (micro-)analysis.  This prov-
ides us with a way to analyze security distinct from viewing it as an essential part of the 
human condition or as an essential social value.  The demand for security is neither a result of 
speech acts nor a side effect of high-tech risk societies.  By emphasing discourses and materia-
lities instead—technologies, artifacts, bodies, and affects—it becomes possible to trace back the 
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emergence of such concepts to specific rationalities of power.  However, as the workshop’s 
final discussion made clear, seeing security as a dispositif still leaves open some important 
questions.  To what extent, for example, is the notion of dispositif still a viable option for 
analyzing contemporary phenomena of security?  In this respect, a number of contributions 
explored connections to other theoretical concepts.  Peter Adey suggested Sloterdijk’s term ‘at-
mospheres’ to emphasize the crucial role of affects in constructing perceptions of (in-)security, 
and Luis Lobo Guerrero proposed the theoretical framework of ‘moral economies’ (Lorraine 
Daston) to underline systems of emotional forces running through every security dispositif.  
With the Deleuzian term, ‘diagram,’ Ben Anderson tried to uncover the force field preceding 
the security dispositifs.  Vasilis Tsianos, facing the current state of technological developments, 
referred to the term ‘assemblage’ coined by Deleuze and Guattari.  In addition, questions of 
coexistence, overlaps, and fusions of (different) security dispositifs were being raised.  While 
life plays a central role in biopolitics, security dispositifs govern life on many different levels 
simultaneously: data-bodies, collective bodies, biological bodies, etc.  At which positions, 
through which strategies, technologies, and mechanisms do different (security) dispositifs int-
eract?  Considering this, additional empirical studies as well as further theoretical reflections 
are needed.   
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